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ARTICLE 
LESSONS FROM THEODICY: THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 
AND THE LIMITS OF GOVERNMENTAL POWER 
David E. Gilbert† 
Why is there any misery at all in the world? Not by chance, 
surely. From some cause then. Is it from the intention of the 
Diety? But he is perfectly benevolent. Is it contrary to his 
intention? But he is almighty. Nothing can shake the solidity of 
this reasoning, so short, so clear, so decisive, except we assert 
that these subjects exceed all human capacity, and that our 
common measures of truth and falsehood are not applicable to 
them. . . .  
David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Although I teach law, I am fascinated by the philosophy of religion. And 
I am fascinated, in particular, by the Problem of Evil, which asserts that the 
following propositions cannot be reconciled:2 
                                                                                                                           
 † A version of this article was presented on May 31, 2010 at a symposium entitled 
“The Monotheistic Religions and the Human Liberties.” The symposium was held in 
Constantza, Romania and was sponsored by The Centre for Religious and Juridical-
Canonical Study and Research of the Three Monotheistic Religions (Mosaic, Christian and 
Islamic) of Ovidius University of Constantza. I understand that this article has been 
published in DIONYSIANA, the Centre’s academic review, and I wish to thank the Centre for 
its invitation to speak at the symposium, for its generous hospitality, and for its permission 
to publish this article in the United States. I also wish to thank David Beck for his help in 
formulating my arguments and F. Phillip Manns for his help in refining them. I am honored 
to be a member of a university faculty that includes such men. Finally, I wish to thank the 
editors and staff of the Liberty University Law Review for their enthusiasm for the article 
and for their careful editorial work. I will always be honored to say that they were once my 
students. Any remaining errors—whether of thought or expression—are mine and mine 
alone. 
 1. DAVID HUME, DIALOGUES CONCERNING NATURAL RELIGION WITH THE POSTHUMOUS 
ESSAYS, “OF THE MORTALITY OF THE SOUL” AND “OF SUICIDE,” AND FROM AN ENQUIRY 
CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, “OF MIRACLES” 66 (Richard H. Popkin ed., Hackett 
Publishing Co. 2d ed. 1988) (1779) (first publication date is for DIALOGUES CONCERNING 
NATURAL RELIGION). 
 2. This is referred to as the logical Problem of Evil. There is also an evidential 
Problem of Evil that stems from the claim that, given the existence of evil, it is improbable 
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God is omnipotent; 
God is omniscient;3 
God is perfectly good; and 
Evil exists. 
My fascination with this topic has much to do with the fact that I am a 
Christian. Yet that is not the whole of the matter. My fascination also stems 
from the fact that the Problem of Evil deals with ultimate questions—
“ultimate” in the sense that they address the absolute limits of certain 
concepts. What does it mean, for example, to say that God is “omnipotent”? 
Does this mean He can “make a four-sided triangle”4 or “a stone too heavy 
for [H]imself to lift”5? And what does it mean to say that God is 
“omniscient”? Does He know the color of a number? Does He know today 
what I will freely choose to do tomorrow? If He does, are my actions, 
therefore, somehow predetermined? 
There is a perhaps less theoretical side to the Problem of Evil. That is the 
aspect of the Problem of Evil that addresses the nature of good and evil. 
What does it mean for a thing or event or person to “be evil”? What does it 
mean for a person to “do good”? These questions are hardly academic. 
Indeed, the answers we give—whether explicitly or implicitly—show up in 
the way we relate to one another and in the way we organize our societies. 
Theistic philosophers have been wrestling with these questions for 
centuries—and by necessity. It is their view of God that is challenged by 
the Problem of Evil. And, though some have been willing to suggest that 
evil is a figment of our imagination,6 many have focused their efforts on 
                                                                                                                           
that the theistic God exists. See, e.g., MARILYN MCCORD ADAMS & ROBERT MERRIHEW 
ADAMS, Introduction to THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 16 (Marilyn McCord Adams & Robert 
Merrihew Adams eds., 1990).  
 3. Omniscience may be considered a trait comprehended by the term “omnipotence.” I 
include it explicitly, however, because it frequently appears in formulations of the problem 
of evil. See, e.g., ADAMS, supra note 2, at 2; ALVIN C. PLANTINGA, GOD, FREEDOM, AND EVIL 
21 (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. 1977) (1974). 
 4. JOHN HICK, EVIL AND THE GOD OF LOVE 265 (Harper & Row, Publishers rev. ed. 
1978). 
 5. RICHARD SWINBURNE, THE COHERENCE OF THEISM 157 (Clarendon Press rev. ed. 
1993). 
 6. See J.L. MACKIE, Evil and Omnipotence 64 MIND 200-12 (1955), reprinted in THE 
PROBLEM OF EVIL 25-37 (Marilyn McCord Adams & Robert Merrihew Adams eds., 1990) at 
26-27. Mackie writes:  
Some have said that evil is an illusion, perhaps because they held that the 
whole world of temporal, changing things is an illusion, and that what we call 
evil belongs only to this world, or perhaps because they held that although 
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explaining the reasons that could have motivated (or in fact did motivate) a 
loving, all-knowing, and all-powerful God to create a world with as much 
evil in it as ours clearly contains.  
From my point of view, the reasons they have come up with are 
fascinating and instructive—and not merely for the insights they suggest 
regarding the character of God and His purposes for our lives. I contend 
that the reasons they give suggest answers to questions we ought to be 
asking about the proper role of government in our societies. For example, in 
my own country many appear to assume that, if there is a problem, 
government must offer a solution. The mere existence of an evil, regardless 
of its source or location, seems to function as a sufficient condition for 
government action. Indeed it is impolite to suggest otherwise. 
I think this view of government is mistaken and destructive. On the 
contrary, I contend the following: 
1. That government cannot eliminate all evil; 
2. That government should not seek to eliminate all evil; 
3. That government must, nevertheless, seek to eliminate some 
evil; and 
4. That systems of law founded on theism are best equipped to 
resolve the practical tension between points (1) and (2), on 
the one hand, and point (3) on the other. 
To explain and support these positions, I intend to draw on the Problem 
of Evil itself, the Judeo-Christian tradition, and on several prominent 
responses to the Problem of Evil, namely Alvin Plantinga’s “Free Will 
Defense,” John Hick’s “Soul-Making Theodicy,” and the eschatological 
theodicy suggested by Roderick Chisholm’s concept of “defeat.” Although 
these are not the only thinkers whose work I will discuss, their arguments 
provide the primary structure for my arguments.  
Before I go on, however, I should distinguish between two kinds of evil: 
moral evil and natural evil. To borrow Alvin Plantinga’s definitions: moral 
evil “is evil that results from free human activity; natural evil is any other 
kind of evil.”7 In this paper, I intend to address the connections I see 
                                                                                                                           
temporal things are much as we see them, those that we call evil are not really 
evil. Some have said that what we call evil is merely the privation of good, that 
evil in a positive sense, evil that would really be opposed to good, does not 
exist. Many have agreed with Pope that disorder is harmony not understood, 
and that partial evil is universal good. 
Id. at 26. 
 7. PLANTINGA, supra note 3, at 30. 
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between the Problem of Evil and the proper limits of governmental power. 
Accordingly, I plan to focus my remarks on moral evil, which is the 
category of evil that government is best equipped to address. There will be 
times, however, when I must refer to or address natural evil. In these cases, 
I will endeavor to be clear that I am discussing natural evil, not moral evil. 
In all other cases, however, you may assume that when I refer to “evil” I 
mean to refer to “moral evil.”  
II. GOVERNMENT CANNOT ELIMINATE ALL EVIL 
Government cannot eliminate all evil, because government lacks—and 
cannot acquire—sufficient knowledge, power, or goodness to achieve this 
end. This is because the elimination of evil requires a level of knowledge, 
power, and goodness approaching the omniscience, omnipotence, and 
perfect goodness that theists attribute to God. That government does not—
and cannot hope to—meet these conditions should be obvious, but I think 
an awareness of this fact is sadly absent from conversations about public 
policy—at least in my own country. Therefore I think it is worthwhile for 
us to remind ourselves of just what is required for us to achieve the utopia 
our leaders purport to offer us when they ask for our vote. 
As I noted before, the Problem of Evil deals with ultimate questions. 
And it purports, among other things, to demand an answer to why there is 
any evil at all, given that God exists and is said to be all-knowing, all-
powerful, and perfectly good. The Problem of Evil is no problem at all, 
however, if God lacks one of these characteristics.8 Perfection—or 
something approaching perfection—with respect to each of these traits is a 
necessary condition for the elimination of all evil. As J.L. Mackie has 
noted: 
If you are prepared to say that God is not wholly good, or not 
quite omnipotent, or that evil does not exist, or that good is not 
opposed to the kind of evil that exists, or that there are limits to 
what an omnipotent thing can do, then the problem of evil will 
not arise for you.9 
If God is aware of some problems but not others, how can I fault him for 
not addressing my bout with cancer? Perhaps it simply has not come to His 
attention. If He can address or prevent some problems but not others, how 
                                                                                                                           
 8. MACKIE, supra note 6, at 25 (“The problem of evil . . . is a problem only for 
someone who believes that there is a God who is both omnipotent and wholly good.”). 
 9. Id. at 26. 
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can I fault Him for not addressing or preventing my skinned knee? Perhaps 
clumsy people are simply beyond His help. And, again, if He is upright 
regarding some matters, and evil regarding others, how can I fault Him if 
my life or my corner of the world is less than perfect? Perhaps He delights 
in looking out for my neighbor but cares nothing for me. It is not enough, 
therefore, for God to know about most evils, to be able to address or prevent 
most problems, or to be good with respect to most matters. If there is to be 
no evil, God must know about every evil and be able to address it, and He 
must be good enough, in every instance, to choose to do so. 
Atheologians, however, regard omniscience, omnipotence, and perfect 
goodness, taken together, as forming a sufficient condition for the 
elimination of all evil. That is, if God can do anything, knows everything, 
and is perfectly good, He must, they argue, eliminate all evil. The fact that 
He has not, they claim, only proves that He must not exist or that, if He 
does exist, He is not the God theists portray Him to be. As Hume wrote, 
speaking in the character of Philo: 
Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? [T]hen is he impotent. 
Is he able, but not willing? [T]hen is he malevolent. Is he both 
able and willing? [W]hence then is evil?10 
The theist’s only out, Philo claims, is to “assert that these subjects [i.e., 
“infinite power, infinite wisdom, and infinite goodness”] exceed all human 
capacity, and that our common measures of truth and falsehood are not 
applicable to them[.]”11 
Yet a thing may be a necessary cause without being a sufficient cause. 
Flour, butter, and sugar may be essentials if I am planning to make cookies, 
but the mere fact that I have them hardly suggests that I have cookies 
baking in my oven. Other things are required: mixing and measuring, to 
name a few. Similarly, a theist who agrees that omnipotence, omniscience, 
and perfect goodness (or levels of competence approaching these) are 
necessary conditions for the suppression of all evil, need not agree that they 
constitute sufficient conditions for this end. As Mackie readily concedes: 
[T]he contradiction [alleged by the Problem of Evil] does not 
arise immediately; to show it we need some additional premises, 
or perhaps some quasi-logical rules connecting the terms “good,” 
“evil,” and “omnipotent.” These additional principles are that 
good is opposed to evil, in such a way that a good thing always 
                                                                                                                           
 10. HUME, supra note 1, at 63. 
 11. Id. at 66. 
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eliminates evil as far as it can, and that there are no limits to 
what an omnipotent thing can do.12 
A theist, therefore, can argue that omniscience, omnipotence, and perfect 
goodness are not sufficient conditions for the elimination of all evil if he 
can identify one circumstance—or perhaps many—in which a “good thing” 
would not “eliminate . . . evil as far as it can” or if he can demonstrate that 
there “are [some] limits to what an omnipotent thing can do.”  
Alvin Plantinga, in his famous “Free Will Defense,” argues that it is 
plausible that both circumstances exist. First, Plantinga contends, “God, 
though omnipotent, could not have actualized just any possible world He 
pleased.”13 He writes: 
It is, of course, up to God whether or not to create Maurice and 
also up to God whether or not to make him [i.e., Maurice] free 
with respect to the action of taking oatmeal . . . . But if He 
creates Maurice and creates him free with respect to this action, 
then whether or not he actually performs the action is up to 
Maurice—not God.14 
Thus, according to Plantinga, once God has determined to make free 
creatures, there will be certain things that are no longer be up to Him—
whether Maurice eats oatmeal or sausages, for example—as long God has 
left it up to Maurice to make this decision. But what possible reason—or 
rather what good reason—could God possibly have for relinquishing His 
sovereignty in this area? Plantinga points to the good that is realized when 
free creatures freely choose to do right. He writes: 
God can create free creatures, but He can’t cause or determine 
them to do only what is right. For if He does so, then they aren’t 
significantly free after all; they do not do what is right freely. . . . 
The fact that free creatures sometimes go wrong . . . counts 
neither against God’s omnipotence nor against His goodness; for 
He could have forestalled the occurrence of moral evil only by 
removing the possibility of moral good.15 
                                                                                                                           
 12. MACKIE, supra note 6, at 26. I have reconfigured Mackie’s punctuation, which 
follows British conventions, to conform it American punctuation conventions. I have done 
so elsewhere and with other sources as necessary. 
 13. PLANTINGA, supra note 3, at 34. Plantinga refers to the contrary notion as “Leibnitz’ 
Lapse.” Id. at 44. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 30. 
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John Hick makes a related point in Evil and the God of Love. He 
contends that the world in which we live supplies conditions necessary for 
the development of virtue. He writes: 
If we then ask what sort of environment is needed for man as a 
morally and spiritually immature creature to grow towards the 
full stature of his humanity, we quickly see that it could not be a 
pain-free paradise. A world without problems, difficulties, perils, 
and hardships would be morally static. For moral and spiritual 
growth comes through response to challenges; and in a paradise 
there would be no challenges.16 
Thus, both Plantinga and Hick argue that something of great value would 
be lost if the world were constituted otherwise. If their assessments are 
correct—a matter I will later consider—then it seems incorrect to say that 
omniscience, omnipotence, and perfect goodness are sufficient (sufficient in 
the sense of demanding) causes for the elimination of evil, however 
necessary they (or their close approximates) may be to that project. 
Some may say, to bring the matter around to government, that 
government need not know everything, have all power, or be perfectly good 
in order to eliminate all evil—assuming the elimination of evil is its proper 
end. It need not, for example, know the precise number of hydrogen atoms 
in the sun. It need not have the ability to reduce the number of those atoms 
by three. Knowledge of or power with respect to such things has nothing to 
do with the suppression of evil. And perhaps, one could say that with 
respect to some things it would be sufficient for government to be merely 
not bad as opposed to positively good.17 That neither the U.S. government 
nor its people are currently disposed to invade Canada is surely not a bad 
thing—though it is hardly a good thing either, however beneficial the 
absence of hostility may be to all concerned. The U.S. government—and its 
people—might have concluded that Canada is simply too cold in the winter. 
But these things should not lead us to conclude that anything less than 
knowledge approaching omniscience, and power approaching omnipotence, 
                                                                                                                           
 16. HICK, supra note 4, at 374. 
 17. Cf. RODERICK M. CHISHOLM, The Defeat of Good and Evil, 42 PROC. AM. PHIL. 
ASS’N 21-38 (1968-1969), reprinted in THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 53-68 (Marilyn McCord 
Adams & Robert Merrihew Adams eds., 1990) at 55-57. Chisholm would term such 
circumstances “neutral states of affairs.” Query, however, whether a neutral state of affairs, 
indeed many neutral states of affairs, could not be said to characterize even a perfect being. 
Cf. id. at 67. 
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and goodness very nearly approaching perfect goodness, would be 
sufficient for government to eliminate all evil. 
Consider, for example, the considerations that go into protecting the 
public from toxic chemicals. I am referring here to what I regard as a moral 
evil—the release of these chemicals into the environment by humans, 
whether intentionally or otherwise. To address this evil, it is not enough for 
government to have statutory or regulatory power to impose limits on how 
certain chemicals are used or to what extent they are released into the 
environment. It is not even sufficient for government and all concerned to 
have agreed upon what level of protection ought to be extended to the 
public—let us assume that all aspire to a “safe” environment. Government 
must know something that is surprisingly difficult to determine: the point at 
which exposure to a given chemical passes from “safe” to “unsafe.” Lead, 
for example, has been poisoning us for centuries, yet we are still learning 
about the dangers it poses to humans. In the early 1970s, experts thought 
that lead poisoning (as determined by the concentration of lead in a 
person’s blood) began at fourty micrograms per deciliter.18 The number 
was later lowered to thirty micrograms per deciliter, then twenty-five 
micrograms per deciliter, and now stands at ten micrograms per deciliter.19 
But even this number is not set in stone. According to the New England 
Journal of Medicine “there may be no threshold for the adverse 
consequences of lead exposure[.]”20 Keep in mind that lead is a well-known 
chemical. The U.S. government’s “TSCA [i.e., Toxic Substances Control 
Act] Inventory contains more than 82,000 chemicals that have been in 
commerce at some point since 1979.”21 We are only beginning to 
understand the hazards presented by many of these chemicals.22 
                                                                                                                           
 18. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND 
POLICY 305 fig. 3.13 (6th ed. 2009). 
 19. Id. at 305 fig. 3.13 and 556. 
 20. RICHARD L. CANFIELD ET AL., Intellectual Impairment in Children with Blood Lead 
Concentrations below 10 µg per Deciliter, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1517, 1525 (2003) 
(internal citations omitted)  
 21. RICHARD A. DENISON, ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE, HIGH HOPES, LOW MARKS: A 
FINAL REPORT CARD ON THE HIGH PRODUCTION VOLUME CHEMICAL CHALLENGE 10 (2007), 
available at http://www.edf.org/documents/6653_HighHopesLowMarks.pdf (last visited 
June 23, 2011) (critiquing the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s program to gather 
basic toxicological information on chemicals that industry uses in large quantities).  
 22. See id. at 10. (“Hazard data being collected under the Challenge are limited to a 
subset of the SIDS, developed under the auspices of the OECD. The SIDS data are generally 
acknowledged to be insufficient to provide the basis for a full hazard assessment, let alone a 
risk assessment, for a chemical. It relies primarily on testing of acute or subchronic toxicity, 
for example, and its ecological endpoints only include toxicity to aquatic organisms.”) 
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Setting the right standard, however, would seem simple for a government 
blessed with omniscience. The right level of exposure would be simply the 
one that is safe. And if we were omniscient we would surely know where to 
draw the line.  
Perhaps, but then again, perhaps not. “Safe” is a loaded term.23 
Surprisingly enough, “safe” can mean many things. To some it might mean 
“risk free.”24 To others it might mean “presents no significant risk of 
harm.”25 To others it might mean “the level of risk I associate with ‘safe’ 
activities”—like playing bridge or riding a bike.26 An omniscient—or 
functionally omniscient—regulator can know the precise level of risk 
associated with a given exposure, but she cannot tell us what a “safe” level 
of exposure is—at least not without making a normative judgment about 
how much risk a person ought to be required to bear.  
And normative judgments depend on what is possible. A truly 
omnipotent (or functionally omnipotent) government could arrange 
circumstances such that only benign chemicals were used by industry and 
such that the use of these chemicals would have no impact on industrial 
output or standards of living. The environment would be “as pure as the 
driven snow”—purer, even, than the driven snow is at present—and yet we 
would all have abundant food, shelter, clothing, and whatever else is 
necessary to lead a fulfilling life. 
Not so, however, for less-than-omnipotent governments. They must 
make choices, and those choices would be hard even if they were blessed 
with perfect knowledge. Although environmental regulation is not always a 
zero sum game—some regulations indeed have proved economically 
                                                                                                                           
 23. See, e.g., Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 642 
(1980) (“By empowering the Secretary to promulgate standards that are ‘reasonably 
necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of 
employment,’ the Act implies that, before promulgating any standard, the Secretary must 
make a finding that the workplaces in question are not safe. But ‘safe’ is not the equivalent 
of ‘risk-free.’ There are many activities that we engage in every day-such as driving a car or 
even breathing city air-that entail some risk of accident or material health impairment; 
nevertheless, few people would consider these activities ‘unsafe.’ Similarly, a workplace can 
hardly be considered ‘unsafe’ unless it threatens the workers with a significant risk of 
harm.”). 
 24. See, e.g., id. (rejecting this understanding of “safe”). 
 25. See, e.g., id. (“Therefore, before he can promulgate any permanent health or safety 
standard, the Secretary is required to make a threshold finding that a place of employment is 
unsafe-in the sense that significant risks are present and can be eliminated or lessened by a 
change in practices.”). 
 26. See, e.g., id. 
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beneficial27—it usually comes at a cost in terms of reduced productivity, 
increased capital investment, and higher prices for goods. These higher 
costs may be fair;28 they may even be right. But if the lines are drawn in the 
“wrong” place—however “wrong” is understood—the lines themselves will 
be a source of evil, if only the evil that results when limited resources are 
applied to suboptimal—dare I say wasteful—ends.  
Consider also what would be required for government to eliminate the 
evil of crime. To do this, it seems we would need to begin by discovering 
every crime that is committed. That, however, is a bigger job than it might 
seem. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, in 2007 there were 
5,371,190 “victimizations” in the United States involving personal crimes 
and 17,508,530 victimizations involving property crimes.29 Yet only forty-
seven percent of personal crimes were reported to the police; only slightly 
more than thirty-seven percent (37.2%) of property crimes were reported to 
the police.30 These victimization numbers—weighted estimates based on 
the results of interviews of 41,000 households and 73,650 individuals31—
are almost certainly low. The National Crime Information Center’s records 
show that 105,229 persons were missing on December 31, 2007.32 At least 
                                                                                                                           
 27. See, e.g., Occupational Exposure to Cotton Dust, 50 Fed. Reg. 51,120 (Dec. 13, 
1985) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910) (final rule by Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration noting that compliance with a permissible exposure limit for cotton dust had 
made industry more productive). 
 28. Fair, for example, in the sense that they reduce externalities. 
 29. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (NCJ 227669), CRIMINAL 
VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 2007 STATISTICAL TABLES: NATIONAL CRIME 
VICTIMIZATION SURVEY 96 tbl. 91 (2010), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvus07.pdf. (last visited May 18, 2010). 
“Victimization” is defined as “[a] crime as it affects one individual person or household. For 
personal crimes, the number of victimizations is equal to the number of victims involved. 
The number of victimizations may be greater than the number of incidents because more 
than one person may be victimized during an incident. Each crime against a household is 
assumed to involve a single victim, the affected household.” Id. at 132. “Personal crimes” 
are defined as “[r]ape, sexual assault, personal robbery, assault, purse snatching and pocket 
picking . . . [and] includes both attempted and completed crimes.” Id. at 130. “Property 
crimes” are defined as “[p]roperty crimes including burglary, motor vehicle theft, or theft . . . 
[and] includes both attempted and completed crimes.” Id. 
 30. Id. at 96 tbl. 91. 
 31. Id. at 119-27 (describing methodology). 
 32. NCIC Missing Person and Unidentified Person Statistics for 2007, NATIONAL 
CRIME INFORMATION CENTER, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, NCIC MISSING PERSON 
AND UNIDENTIFIED PERSON STATISTICS FOR 2007, available at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/ 
cjisd/missingpersons.htm. (last visited on June 23, 2011). 
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some of them, no doubt, were missing because they were victims of a 
crime. I doubt many of them were surveyed.33 
It is not enough, however, to know that a crime has happened. In order to 
properly mete out punishment, government needs to know the precise 
circumstances of the crime. And this is an instance where omniscience 
would surely come in handy. For if government sends the wrong person to 
jail, government becomes a source of evil.  
What would be necessary for government to achieve functional 
omniscience of this sort? I suppose it could begin by posting workable 
video cameras on every light post of every city and town. Cameras may 
have played a role in apprehending the person suspected of planting a car 
bomb in Times Square.34 There were eighty-two cameras watching the 
vicinity of the crime,35 though “watching” is probably too generous a term. 
Strictly speaking, cameras only record; they cannot “watch.” That requires 
a person. And, given what the Times Square footage has revealed,36 I am 
not sure that a person, even paying close attention, would have noticed 
anything amiss. Perhaps there just were not enough cameras.37 
But the streets of cities and towns are hardly the only places crimes 
happen. Crimes also happen behind closed doors. Perhaps, then, 
government could resort to planting cameras in every room of every home, 
apartment, or office building. A school district in Pennsylvania was recently 
accused of attempting something like this, only on a much more modest 
scale. The school district allegedly activated cameras on students’ 
                                                                                                                           
 33. And perhaps we should remember that not every evil deed is punishable as a crime. 
 34. See, e.g., WILLIAM K. RASHBAUM & MICHAEL WILSON, Car in Bomb Case Changed 
Owners in Past 3 Weeks, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2010, at A22 (discussing relevant video 
footage). 
 35. Id. (“The police continued sifting through footage from 82 city cameras mounted 
from 34th Street to 51st Street between Avenue of the Americas and Eighth Avenue and 
those from untold number [sic] of business and tourist cameras.”) 
 36. See id. (describing a “man [who] was seen walking away from the area where the 
pathfinder was parked” and who “looked over his shoulder at least twice and pulled off a 
shirt” and another man who was recorded “running north on Broadway at the time the fire 
broke out on the Pathfinder . . . .”). 
 37. TIM MINTON, Saturday Scare Delivers Call for More Cameras: Technology Also 
Key to Mining Evidence, NBC N.Y., May 4, 2010, http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local-
beat/Saturday-Scare-Delivers-Call-For-More-Cameras-92723589.html (last visited on May 
18, 2010) (“Apparently 80 is not enough. . . . Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly says 
there should be a recorded view of every street and sidewalk from Central Park down to 34th 
Street.”). 
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computers that allowed the district to photograph students in their homes.38 
This activity—which led to a law suit and an F.B.I investigation39—has 
been stopped.40 U.S. law is presently opposed to governmental 
omniscience.41 This would need to change, however, if we meant to get 
truly serious about eliminating all crime. 
And of course, it would hardly be sufficient to have cameras indoors 
only. Crimes also occur out of doors in remote areas. And it is hardly 
enough to see what is happening—photos and even video footage can be 
misleading. To get it right—in every case—government would surely need 
an audio recording. 
Then again, it would hardly seem sufficient for government to merely 
punish crime. If the task is eliminating crime, government must be granted 
the ability to predict crimes and thereby prevent them before they occur. 
Philosophers refer to the ability to know in advance what free individuals 
will freely choose to do as “middle knowledge.”42 Some philosophers are 
not sure, however, that even God possesses this knowledge,43 and if we 
could somehow invest government with such knowledge, we would need to 
be quite sure that it with is knowledge of what a person will do, inexorably, 
as opposed to knowledge of what a person is merely likely to do. As Robert 
Adams has noted, “We have a well entrenched belief that under many 
counterfactual conditions many a person might have acted out of character, 
                                                                                                                           
 38. See GREGG KEIZER, Federal Judge Orders Pa. Schools to Stop Laptop Spying, 
COMPUTER WORLD, February 23, 2010, http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9160878/ 
Federal_judge_orders_Pa._schools_to_stop_laptop_spying (last visited May 6, 2010). 
 39. See id. 
 40. See id.; see also BALLARD SPAHR, LLP, REPORT OF INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION: 
REGARDING REMOTE MONITORING OF STUDENT LAPTOP COMPUTERS BY THE LOWER MERION 
SCHOOL DISTRICT (2010), http://www.lmsd.org/documents/news/100503_ballard_spahr_ 
report.pdf (last visited May 6, 2010). Although the program led to the acquisition of 30,564 
photographs, the district appears to have been more interested in recovering lost or stolen 
laptops than it was in spying on its students—at least according to the law firm hired to 
investigate the matter. See id. at 2-3. 
 41. The Fourth Amendment, for starters, gets in the way: “The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 42. See, e.g., ROBERT MERRIHEW ADAMS, Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil, 
14AM. PHIL. Q. 109-17 (1977), reprinted in THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 110-25 (Marilyn McCord 
Adams & Robert Merrihew Adams eds., 1990) at 110-11. 
 43. See id. at 124-25. 
2011] LESSONS FROM THEODICY 391 
 
 
although he probably would not have.”44 Here again, if government gets it 
wrong, it risks becoming a source of great evil.45 
And, of course, even perfect knowledge of what each one of us will do 
on a particular occasion is hardly enough. Government would also need the 
heroic ability to intervene, in every instance, in every place, the moment 
before every crime is committed. To intervene too early would be to 
perpetrate a wrong. 
Perhaps, on the other hand, government could change its people, making 
them into law-abiding people who always freely choose to do right. Mackie 
has asked, 
[I]f God has made men such that in their free choices they 
sometimes prefer what is good and sometimes what is evil, why 
could he not have made men such that they always freely choose 
the good?46 
Plantinga has argued, for reasons I will take up later, that this option was 
perhaps unavailable to God when He set out to make free persons. But, 
setting this aside, what sorts of powers would be necessary for government 
to make us into people who “always freely choose the good”? In our world, 
government functions always, and only, through force. Even the money 
government purports to give away must first be acquired by force. (If you 
doubt this, try refusing to pay your taxes!) What applications of force could 
achieve this end?  
Perhaps government could compel moral education. I doubt this would 
work, however. In my country, government already compels education in 
math and reading (among other things). The results are not encouraging. 
One study of U.S. students found that “27% of eighth-graders could not 
correctly shade 1/3 of a rectangle and 45% could not solve a word problem 
                                                                                                                           
 44. Id. at 117 (emphasis added). 
 45. For an interesting exploration of what governmental middle knowledge—or its close 
approximation—might look like, see MINORITY REPORT (20th Century Fox, et al. 2002). 
Information about this film is available at THE INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE 
http://www.imdb.come/title/tt0181689 (last visited June 25, 2010). 
 46. MACKIE, supra note 6, at 33. 
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that required dividing fractions[.]”47 A 2009 study of U.S. fourth graders 
revealed that only “33 percent [were reading] at or above Proficient . . . .”48  
These numbers are certainly subject to improvement—and students in 
other nations already achieve at higher levels49—but the standard, 
remember, is perfection, and we are nowhere close to that level of 
achievement.  And let us also remember that reading and math, 
comparatively speaking, are easy skills to teach. How likely is any program 
of education, however well constructed, to produce graduates who always 
freely choose the right?50  
Perhaps in the end, government would have to resort to the extraordinary 
measure of simply compelling right conduct. But how could that be done? 
It would be too expensive to assign a police officer to each one of us. And 
who would police the police officers assigned to police us?51 Perhaps 
government could simply install a chip in each of our brains, and a set of 
electrodes in each of our spines, that together would produce warm and 
pleasant feelings each time we did something right and a nasty shock every 
time we did something wrong.52 Perhaps, in time, we would all feel 
                                                                                                                           
 47. NAT’L MATHEMATICS ADVISORY PANEL, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FOUNDATIONS FOR 
SUCCESS: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL MATHEMATICS ADVISORY PANEL 3 (2008), 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/bdscomm/list/Mathpanel/report/final-report.pdf (last visited May 
6, 2010) (citing a 2004 report of the U.S. Department of Education). 
 48. NAT’L CENTER FOR EDUC. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE NATION’S REPORT 
CARD: READING 2009: NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF EDUCATIONAL PROGRESS AT GRADES 4 AND 
8 (NCES 2010-458) 8 (2010), http://nationsreportcard.gov/reading_2009/reading_ 
2009_report/ (last visited May 18, 2010). 
 49. See, e.g., NAT’L CENTER FOR EDUC. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., HIGHLIGHTS FROM 
TIMSS 2007: MATHEMATICS AND SCIENCE ACHIEVEMENT OF U.S. FOURTH AND EIGHTH-
GRADE STUDENTS IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT (NCES 2009-1) 6 (2009), 
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2009/2009001.pdf (last visited May 18, 2010) (“At grade four, the 
average U.S. mathematics score was higher than those in 23 of the 35 other countries, lower 
than those in 8 countries (all 8 were in Asia or Europe), and not measurably different from 
the average scores in the remaining 4 countries. At grade eight, the average U.S. 
mathematics score was higher than those in 37 of the 47 other countries, lower than those in 
5 countries (all of them located in Asia), and not measurably different from the average 
scores in the other 5 countries.”). 
 50. See FREDERICK BASTIAT, THE LAW 25 (Cosimo Classics 2006) (1850) (“You say: 
‘Here are persons who are lacking in morality or religion,’ and you turn to the law. But law 
is force. And need I point out what a violent and futile effort it is to use force in the matters 
of morality and religion?”). 
 51. As Plato and Virgil famously asked, who will watch the watchmen? 
 52. This might require us to reduce right and wrong to a set of principles that could be 
expressed in computer code. This may not be possible. See generally JONATHAN DANCY, 
ETHICS WITHOUT PRINCIPLES (2006). 
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strongly inclined toward helping old ladies across the street, and we would 
all develop a steadfast abhorrence for cruelty and overeating. But if 
government resorted to these measures, would we be good? I think not, for 
reasons I will elaborate later. 
An issue I have avoided so far is whether government, however little or 
much knowledge or power we entrust to it, can eliminate all evil without 
being, itself, perfectly good. As we have seen, the degree of knowledge and 
the level of power required for the suppression of all evil is quite 
extraordinary. If we could construct a government that was sufficiently 
knowledgeable and sufficiently powerful to eliminate all evil, could we 
trust it to do so if any public servant—from the lowliest dog catcher to the 
most powerful executive officer, judge, or senator—were anything less than 
perfectly good? Again, I think not. And I think this is the most telling 
reason why government is incapable of eliminating all evil.  
Someone might protest, perhaps, that, if only we could construct the 
right government—one that knows enough to recognize and punish every 
evil and one that is powerful enough to do so, and one that, through 
appropriate measures, could change the way people think and live—then, 
over time we could, surely we could, eliminate all evil. But who, I ask, is 
good enough to create such a system? Who could be trusted, trusted to that 
degree, with the fate of mankind? Only someone outside the system-
someone who would not first require reformation before he could reform. 
As N.T. Wright has observed, “the line between good and evil runs not 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’ but through every individual and every society.”53 
Only God could fit the bill.  
You may think I have belabored the obvious. I hope so. I hope it is 
perfectly obvious to you that government cannot eliminate every evil. I 
have labored, however, over this unremarkable proposition, because I fear 
that those of us who take it seriously are a very small minority—at least in 
the United States. The public official most likely to be booed and most 
likely to be chastised by the press is the official who has the audacity to 
suggest that government cannot solve the crisis of the day—or who fails to 
solve it within a news cycle.  
I also think it is striking how neatly the Problem of Evil, with its 
emphasis on knowledge, power, and goodness, frames the debates we have 
about how government should respond to problems. When disaster or 
human wickedness strikes, how does government respond? It demands 
more knowledge—more cameras in public places, more authority to 
intercept conversations, more spies. It demands more power—new and 
                                                                                                                           
 53. N.T. WRIGHT, EVIL AND THE JUSTICE OF GOD 43 (2006). 
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tougher laws, more policemen, more days of school, more programs, more 
accountability. And, if government appears somehow remotely responsible, 
we (or our leaders) demand that government be made better—and so we 
hold hearings, pass reforms, or gear up for the next election. Having 
banished the theistic God from our minds, we seem nevertheless 
determined to construct a god of our own—omniscient, omnipotent, and 
perfectly good—in our own image. 
Thus, I think we would do well to remember just what is necessary if we 
are determined to eliminate all evil—or to conquer, truly conquer, even the 
crisis of the day. Nothing short of functional omniscience, functional 
omnipotence, and very-near-perfect goodness will do. If we keep in mind 
the limits of governmental power, we are less likely to build our lives on, or 
surrender our liberties for, what will never be. And, perhaps more to the 
point, if Plantinga and Hick are right about the value of freedom and the 
value of moral growth, we may find that government has very good reasons 
to allow some evil to exist. 
III. GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT SEEK TO ELIMINATE ALL EVIL. 
The fact that government cannot, in fact, suppress all evil, you may say, 
is hardly a reason not to try. I will never play tennis like Roger Federer, but 
why should that keep me from trying? The answer, it seems, depends on 
what we mean by “trying.” If I play as often as my schedule and 
responsibilities permit and devote my energies, when I am playing, to 
improving my skill, no one can fault me. I may even be excused for reading 
about tennis on my vacation. If, however, I quit my job, neglect my 
children, and spend every waking hour on the tennis court, few would call 
me anything but a fool. I simply haven’t the talent. So some “goals”—
apparently good goals, even—are proper goals only if we do not truly 
pursue them.  
Now it is certainly proper for Roger Federer—and any tennis player with 
the requisite talent—to aspire to world class excellence. For Federer—and 
his rivals—the drive to be the world’s best is perfectly appropriate. But is it 
possible that there are some good goals that no one should truly pursue? 
The elimination of all evils, or even the perfect suppression of any one evil, 
may be such a goal.  
As I noted before, the Problem of Evil deals with ultimate questions. 
Why is there evil—any evil at all—in the world, given that God, who is 
said to be all-knowing, all-powerful, and perfectly good, exists. Atheists 
have assumed that omniscience, omnipotence, and perfect goodness are 
sufficient causes for the elimination of evil. But necessary conditions are 
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not the same thing as sufficient conditions. There may be things that even 
an omnipotent being cannot do, and even a perfectly good being can have a 
morally sufficient reason for choosing not to suppress every evil. 
Alvin Plantinga, a theist whose name is synonymous with the “free will 
defense,”54 has argued that  
A world containing creatures who are significantly free (and 
freely perform more good than evil actions) is more valuable, all 
else being equal, than a world containing no free creatures at all. 
Now God can create free creatures, but He can’t cause or 
determine them to do only what is right. For if He does so, then 
they aren’t significantly free after all; they do not do what is 
right freely. To create creatures capable of moral good, therefore, 
He must create creatures capable of moral evil; and He can’t give 
these creatures freedom to perform evil and at the same time 
prevent them from doing so. . . . [T]his is the source of moral 
evil. The fact that free creatures sometimes go wrong, however, 
counts neither against God’s omnipotence nor against His 
goodness; for He could have forestalled the occurrence of moral 
evil only by removing the possibility of moral good.55 
Note the extraordinary role that human freedom plays in this argument 
and the basis for its value. Plantinga is claiming that the good that comes 
from free choices is good enough to justify the creation of an entire world 
where moral evil exists. This is because, according to Plantinga: 
1. Moral evil—or at least its possibility—is the price of moral 
good; 
2. No one, not even God, can avoid paying this price; and 
3. A world with free creatures who sometimes choose to do 
evil—but who more often choose to do good—is more 
valuable than a world with no evil at all.  
I will take up each point in its turn. 
                                                                                                                           
 54. Plantinga draws a distinction between a “defense,” which suggests “at most what 
God’s reason might possibly be” for permitting evil, and a “theodicy,” which purports “to 
tell us what God’s reason for permitting evil really is.” PLANTINGA, supra note 3, at 28. The 
significance of this distinction will become clear. 
 55. Id. 
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A. Moral Evil—or At Least Its Possibility—Is the Price of Moral Good 
Plantinga is neither the first, nor the only person, to argue that freedom 
to do good requires a corresponding freedom to do evil. Augustine wrote 
that: 
It is sufficient for our question, why free will should have been 
given to man, to know that without it man cannot live rightly. . . . 
[I]f man did not have free choice of will, how could there exist 
the good according to which it is just to condemn evildoers and 
reward those who act rightly? What was not done by will would 
be neither evil doing nor right action. Both punishment and 
reward would be unjust if man did not have free will. Moreover, 
there needs be justice both in punishment and in reward, since 
justice is one of the goods that are from God. Therefore, God 
must needs [sic] have given free will to man.56 
John Hick, describing the traditional free will defense, has written: 
The second phase of the argument claims that there is a 
necessary connection between personality and moral freedom 
such that the idea of the creation of personal beings who are not 
free to choose wrongly as well as rightly is self-contradictory 
and therefore does not fall within the scope of the divine 
omnipotence. If man is to be a being capable of entering into 
personal relationship with his Maker, and not a mere puppet, he 
must be endowed with the uncontrollable gift of freedom. For 
freedom, including moral freedom, is an essential element in 
what we know as personal as distinct from non-personal life. In 
order to be a person man must be free to choose right and wrong. 
He must be a morally responsible agent with a real power of 
moral choice.57 
Hick concludes that this argument is “clearly sound” and that it draws no 
objections from those inclined to reject the free will defense.58 
This thinking is not confined to Christian theists. Rabbi Harold Kushner 
has argued: 
                                                                                                                           
 56. AUGUSTINE, ON FREE CHOICE OF THE WILL bk. II, ch. 1, 36 (Anna Benjamin & L.H. 
Hackstaff trans., Bobbs-Merril 1964) quoted in JOHN S. FEINBERG, THE MANY FACES OF 
EVIL: THEOLOGICAL SYSTEMS AND THE PROBLEMS OF EVIL 69 (rev. and expanded ed. 2004). 
 57. HICK, supra note 4, at 266. 
 58. Id. 
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In order to let us be free, in order to let us be human, God has to 
leave us free to choose to do right or to do wrong. If we are not 
free to choose evil, then we are not free to choose good either. 
Like the animals, we can only be convenient or inconvenient, 
obedient or disobedient. We can no longer be moral, which 
means we can no longer be human.59 
Rabbi Kushner concedes that neither he nor anyone else can say why 
God chose to bring such persons into being. He is certain, however, that 
“He did, and the world has seen a lot of nobility and a lot of cruelty ever 
since.”60 
B. No One, Not Even God, Can Avoid Paying This Price 
Now we come to the more controversial aspects of the free will defense. 
Perhaps being good requires making choices, but does that mean that God 
must play no role in the choices we make? If I am inclined to slap people 
when I get too tired, could not God simply arrange things such that I always 
go to bed early and always get a good night’s sleep? There would be no 
slapping then. If hunger inclines me to say unkind things, could He not 
arrange the world such that I always have a full stomach? On such terms, I 
might always be civil. And in each case, you could say that my decision to 
refrain from slapping or to speak only kind words was my choice.  
Plantinga is not persuaded. “One might as well claim,” he writes, “that 
being in jail does not really limit one’s freedom on the grounds that if one 
were not in jail, he’d be free to come and go as he pleased.”61 Plantinga has 
a more robust notion of freedom in mind. According to him: 
If a person is free with respect to a given action, then he is free to 
perform that action and free to refrain from performing it; no 
antecedent conditions and/or causal laws determine that he will 
perform the action, or that he won’t. It is within his power, at the 
time in question, to take or perform the action and within his 
power to refrain from it.62 
                                                                                                                           
 59. HAROLD S. KUSHNER, WHEN BAD THINGS HAPPEN TO GOOD PEOPLE 80 (Avon Books 
1983) (emphasis original). 
 60. Id. 
 61. PLANTINGA, supra note 3, at 32. Plantinga is responding to what I assume is a 
similar objection offered by Anthony Flew. See id. at 31. 
 62. Id. at 29. 
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And according to Plantinga, a person is not “significantly free” unless the 
choice he is free to make is “morally significant . . . [i.e.,] if it would be 
wrong for him to perform the action but right to refrain or vice versa.”63 
Thus, on these terms, a person who is gentle and civil only because he is 
well-fed and well-rested, may make many morally significant choices 
during the course of the day, but he is never significantly free with respect 
to these choices. And, I might add, such a person little deserves our 
respect—though we might have high regard for his cook! 
J.L. Mackie has offered a more challenging objection: 
[I]f God has made men such that in their free choices they 
sometimes prefer what is good and what is evil, why could he 
not have made men such that they always freely choose the 
good? If there is no logical impossibility in a man’s freely 
choosing the good on one, or on several occasions, there cannot 
be a logical impossibility in his freely choosing the good on 
every occasion. God was not, then, faced with a choice between 
making innocent automata and making beings who, in acting 
freely, would sometimes go wrong: there was open to him the 
obviously better possibility of making beings who would act 
freely but always go right.64 
This argument depends, however, on an assumption that God’s 
omnipotence means that He can do anything He pleases. Plantinga thinks 
this assumption is false. Indeed, he claims that “what is really characteristic 
[of] and central to the Free Will Defense is the claim that God, though 
omnipotent, could not have actualized just any possible world He 
pleased.”65 
To explain this claim, Plantinga introduces two characters: Paul and 
Maurice. Paul must decide whether to sell an aardvark.66 Maurice, whom 
you have met, must decide whether to eat oatmeal.67 Plantinga claims that 
                                                                                                                           
 63. Id. at 30. 
 64. MACKIE, supra note 6, at 33. 
 65. PLANTINGA, supra note 3, at 34 (emphasis added). Note the word “actualized.” 
Plantinga draws a distinction between “creating” and “actualizing.” According to Plantinga, 
God does not create states of affairs (e.g., there being ants), He actualizes them; He does not 
actualize things (e.g., ants), He creates them. Plantinga also draws a distinction between 
states of affairs that “exist” and states of affairs that “obtain.” See id. at 38-39. These 
distinctions, though important, are not central to my analysis. 
 66. See id. at 40-42. 
 67. See id. at 42-44. 
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God can determine whether Paul sells his aardvark and whether Maurice 
eats oatmeal. God has ways, after all, of bringing such things about. What 
He cannot do, however, is determine that Paul freely sells his aardvark for a 
given price or that Maurice freely chooses to eat oatmeal. If these choices 
are truly up to Paul and Maurice, they cannot be up to God. So, Plantinga 
concludes, “there are any number of possible worlds such that it is partly up 
to Paul [or Maurice] whether God can create them.”68 
This is hardly the end of the matter, however. For Paul may be free to 
decide whether to sell his aardvark, and Maurice may be free to choose (or 
reject) oatmeal, but neither has any choice about whether he will exist. That 
is up to God, and since Plantinga believes that God knows in advance what 
each will freely choose to do,69 Plantinga is not off the hook yet. If God 
knows what Paul and Maurice will freely choose to do and yet He chooses 
still to create them, is He not to blame for the choices they make? 
To address this objection, Plantinga introduces another character, a 
corrupt politician by the name of Curley Smith.70 Curley is offered a 
bribe—and he takes it—but things could have been otherwise. Since this 
decision was up to Curley, he could have asked for more or have simply 
refused. And again, since God knows in advance what Curley will do, it 
would seem perfectly reasonable to blame Him for Curley’s actions.  
Plantinga is not so sure, however. Yes, it is possible to imagine a world 
where Curley freely refuses all bribes and refrains from any other sins. But 
is it not also possible, Plantinga asks, that in any world where Curley exists 
and is significantly free, there is at least one morally significant action—
some sin—that Curley will always freely choose to commit?71 In other 
words, perhaps Curley is the sort of person who, regardless of what sort of 
world he is placed in, will always mess up. Plantinga calls this “transworld 
depravity.”72  
And Curley may not be the only one afflicted with transworld depravity. 
Perhaps we all have it, Plantinga suggests.73 And perhaps we are not the 
only ones. He writes: 
[I]t is possible that every creaturely essence—every essence 
including the property of being created by God—suffers from 
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 69. See id. 
 70. See id. at 45-47. 
 71. See id. at 47. 
 72. Id. at 48. 
 73. See id. 
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transworld depravity. But now suppose this is true. Now God can 
create a world containing moral good only by creating 
significantly free persons. And, since every person is the 
instantiation of an essence, He can create significantly free 
persons only by instantiating some essences. . . . Under these 
conditions God could have created a world containing no moral 
evil only by creating one without significantly free persons.74 
Thus Plantinga is saying—and note this construction—that it is at least 
possible that every person God has created, or will create, or ever could 
create “suffers from transworld depravity.” If this is so, then the existence 
of some moral evil truly is the price of moral good. And not even God can 
avoid paying it. 
C. A World with Free Creatures Who Sometimes Choose to Do Evil—But 
Who More Often Choose to Do Good—Is More Valuable Than a World 
with No Evil At All 
Perhaps, then, moral evil is the price of moral good. And perhaps this 
price is unavoidable. But are significantly free creatures worth the trouble? 
Plantinga says, “Yes”—as long as they “freely perform more good than evil 
actions . . . .”75 Thus, the key question, according to Plantinga, is not 
whether “God could have created a world containing less moral evil than 
the actual world contains.”76 Clearly He could have by leaving out creatures 
like us. The question we ought to be asking, according to Plantinga, is 
whether “it [was] within God’s power to create a world that contained a 
better mixture of moral good and evil than Kronos [i.e. the world we 
actually live in] . . . .” Here, again, Plantinga answers, “maybe not.” 
Perhaps the only other available essences would have made at least as great 
a mess of this world as we have made.77  
As Plantinga makes clear, he is writing a “defense,” not a “theodicy.”78 
He, thus, feels free to speculate about “possibilities,” because he is only 
trying to rebut the charge of inconsistency. His “aim is not to say what 
God’s reason is, but at most what God’s reason might possibly be.”79 You 
                                                                                                                           
 74. Id. at 53. 
 75. Id. at 30. 
 76. Id. at 55. 
 77. Id. at 55-57. This is a grossly over-simplified statement of Plantinga’s response to 
this question, but an extended treatment is unnecessary. 
 78. Id. at 28. 
 79. Id. 
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should not, therefore, wonder about his intellectual gifts (or your own) if 
you find his notion of “transworld depravity”—whether applied to 
individuals, the human race, or even essences—implausible. 
  However speculative some of his arguments may be, note that every 
one of them owes its life, so to speak, to two key assumptions. The first 
assumption is that free choices are valuable—indeed, vastly more valuable 
even than merely right actions. The second assumption is that a world 
where people freely choose the right more often than they choose the 
wrong—even where they choose the wrong far too often—is more valuable 
than a world where people never choose the right or the wrong because they 
have no choice at all. If “the claim that it is possible that God could not 
have created a universe containing moral good . . . without creating one that 
also contained moral evil” is the “heart of the Free Will Defense[,]”80 these 
assumptions are surely its lifeblood. Drained of their strength, Plantinga’s 
arguments would persuade no one. In fact, however, Plantinga’s argument 
is considered a formidable one—William Rowe, for example, a “friendly 
atheist,”81 has referred to it as “fairly compelling.”82 
For my part, I think Plantinga’s assumptions are correct—or that they at 
least approach very close to the truth. Hick and Kushner are right to suggest 
that our status as persons,83 and our very humanity,84 would be lost if our 
freedom to make morally significant choices were taken away. After all, 
even Adam and Eve were given one command to obey—and the freedom to 
break it.85  
But I will go one step further. At some vastly reduced level, even a dog 
is significantly free—at least in one sense. Although a dog cannot choose 
his master, he can choose how he feels about him. This is why we value 
dogs. 
Augustine wrote:  
                                                                                                                           
 80. Id. at 31 (emphasis added). 
 81. WILLIAM L. ROWE, The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism, 16 AM. 
PHIL. Q. 335-41 (1979), reprinted in THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 126-37, 126 (Marilyn McCord 
Adams & Robert Merrihew Adams eds., 1990).  
 82. Id. at 126 n.1. 
 83. HICK, supra note 4, at 266. 
 84. KUSHNER, supra note 59, at 80. 
 85. See Genesis 2:15-17 (NASB):  
Then the LORD God took the man and put him into the garden of Eden to 
cultivate it and keep it. The LORD God commanded the man, saying, “From any 
tree of the garden you may eat freely; but from the tree of the knowledge of 
good and evil you shall not eat, for in the day that you eat from it you will 
surely die.” 
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Such is the generosity of God’s goodness that He has not 
refrained from creating even that creature which He foreknew 
would not only sin, but remain in the will to sin. As a runaway 
horse is better than a stone which does not run away because it 
lacks self-movement and sense perception, so the creature is 
more excellent which sins by free will than that which does not 
sin only because it has no free will.86 
We do not value the horse because it runs away, the dog because it bites 
(unless it bites a burglar!), or the human because he sins. We value the 
horse because, when it has been properly trained, it can use its strength to 
work for us and its intelligence to work with us. We value dogs because, if 
we treat them kindly, they will gladly give their lives for us and shower us 
with affection. Their capacity for affection is what makes them valuable, 
even if those faculties sometimes come at the cost of chewed slippers or 
messes on the floor. 
We value humans most of all—and our spouses and children in 
particular—but this is not because we think they are “safer” or “tamer” than 
dogs or horses. Indeed the people we love the most have the greatest 
capacity to wound us, and they often do wound us. Yet the love they freely 
give is worth the pain they sometimes inflict. This is because love cannot be 
forced. It must be free. Love that is not freely given is not given at all. Love 
ultimately is the source and the essence of the good that freedom makes 
possible. 
Hick makes a similar point. Although he accepts the value of 
significantly-free choices,87 he agrees that God could have made us such 
that we would always freely choose to do right. After all, Christ was 
tempted “‘in every respect . . . as we are, yet without sinning.’”88 But Hick 
writes: 
God can without contradiction be conceived to have so 
constituted men that they could be guaranteed always freely to 
act rightly in relation to one another. But He cannot without 
contradiction be conceived to have so constituted men that they 
                                                                                                                           
 86. AUGUSTINE, THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE (388), reprinted in 22 ANCIENT 
CHRISTIAN WRITERS bk. 3, 15 (The Newman Press 1955). 
 87. See HICK, supra note 4, at 266. 
 88. Id. at 267 (quoting Hebrews 4:15). Perhaps this is explained by the fact that Christ 
was not created. However, to offer this distinction, one must, it seems, concede that there is 
something an omnipotent being cannot do—i.e., create beings who always freely choose the 
right. 
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could be guaranteed freely to respond to Himself in authentic 
faith and love and worship. The contradiction involved here 
would be a contradiction between the idea of A loving and 
devoting him/herself to B, and of B valuing this love as a 
genuine and free response to himself whilst knowing that he has 
so constructed or manipulated A’s mind as to produce it.89 
Hick’s point: if our love was the good God was seeking, not even He could 
have it without granting us the freedom to reject Him. 
Plantinga’s arguments solve some theological problems but perhaps only 
at the expense of creating others. The notion that moral evil—or rather its 
possibility—is necessary for moral good seems at odds with Christian 
eschatology. John’s description of the New Jerusalem suggests that it will 
contain no sinners.90 Does this mean there will be no moral good? Will 
God’s “bond-servants . . . serve Him”91 because they are not free? The 
answer, it seems to me, must be that there will be no moral evil, because 
God’s servants will freely choose the good.92 If that is the case, Mackie’s 
question remains: Why not now? Why not make everyone, now, such that 
he freely chooses the good?  
A similar objection could be offered to Hick’s soul-making argument.93 
He writes: “[A] world without problems, difficulties, perils, and hardships 
would be morally static. For moral and spiritual growth comes through 
response to challenges; and in a paradise there would be no challenges.”94 
But this, too, seems at odds with the Christian hope of a New Jerusalem 
where “God Himself will be among them, and . . . [where] there will no 
longer be any mourning, or crying, or pain . . . .”95 “If love is at its strongest 
and deepest amidst trials and difficulties, must there not be trials and 
                                                                                                                           
 89. Id. at 275. 
 90. See Revelation 22:14-15 (NASB)  
Blessed are those who wash their robes, so that they may have the right to the 
tree of life, and may enter by the gates into the city. Outside are the dogs and 
the sorcerers and the immoral persons and the murderers and the idolators, and 
everyone who loves and practices lying. 
 91. Revelation 22:3c (NASB). 
 92. Note, however, that John says, “they will see His face, and His name will be on their 
foreheads.” Revelation 22:4 (NASB). It would take considerable temerity to disobey God 
under such circumstances! Note: The New American Standard Bible uses italics to indicate 
supplied words. Here and elsewhere I have not italicized these words. 
 93. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 94. HICK, supra note 4, at 374. 
 95. Revelation 21:3d-4. 
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difficulties in heaven?”96 Hick suggests several responses,97 including the 
following: 
As the essence of all sin is selfishness, so its opposite is a 
negating of the self-regarding ego. Growth in this “self-
naughting,” or liberation from the ego, shows itself in the growth 
of that love for others which is the essence of morality. . . . [I]n 
this world of tension and conflict, unselfish agape expresses 
itself as a range of moral virtues. But the central spiritual state of 
the transcendence of egoity can continue beyond its expression 
in these different virtues.98 
This must contain something of the truth, for God, who is love,99 did not 
become somehow more loving when He created the earth and mankind. 
These theological problems need not be solved, however, before we can 
apply Plantinga’s and Hick’s insights to government. In this context, for 
example, we need not speculate about “transworld depravity.” We know for 
a fact that we are all afflicted with “this-world depravity”—that is, we 
possess the characteristic of being such that there is at least one morally 
significant decision that, if it is left up to us, we will get wrong between the 
time we are born and the time we die. The Psalmist is more blunt: “There is 
no one who does good, not even one.”100  
So government has on its hands a bunch of sinners. As I noted before, 
government cannot remake us into something better. It simply lacks the 
power—nothing short of omnipotence would be sufficient—and it could 
not be trusted with that sort of power if it were available. The Psalmist is 
pretty clear after all: no one is good.101  
Since we cannot be remade—and government cannot know in advance 
what sins we will commit—its options are limited.102 One option, however, 
is to do the best job it can of punishing us after we have stepped out of line. 
This action, it must be hoped, will tend to deter criminals or take them out 
of circulation—and, naturally, if some “rehabilitation” occurs—so much the 
better. Another option is to take over the moral responsibilities we neglect. 
                                                                                                                           
 96. HICK, supra note 4, at 351. 
 97. See id. at 351-52. 
 98. Id. at 382-83. 
 99. 1 John 4:8 (NASB) (“The one who does not love does not know God, for God is 
love.”).  
 100. Psalm 14:3b (NASB). 
 101. Id. 
 102. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text. 
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For example, government could “take up a collection,”103 and then 
distribute the funds to the poor, the sick, and the otherwise needy. Both 
approaches seem necessary if government is stamp out as much evil as is 
humanly possible.  
To the extent government succeeds by deterring, disabling, or reforming 
criminals, it will have reduced the existence of evil. Certainly this is to be 
desired. As Plantinga observed, a world with significantly free creatures is a 
good world as long as they “freely perform more good than evil actions 
. . . .”104 Perhaps by suppressing evil actions, government can keep the sum 
totals of good and evil actions in the proper balance. If Augustine, 
Plantinga, Hick, and Kushner are right, will not something of great value be 
lost—or at least diminished—as government approaches the limits of its 
power to suppress evil? If punishment becomes a near certainty for every 
crime or misdeed—whether speaking an unkind word or robbing a bank—
people will commit fewer crimes. The prudent will refrain, and the 
imprudent will be restrained. In a functional sense, their freedom to do 
wrong will be substantially extinguished. 
Is this a bad thing? I am not so sure. Frankly, I struggle to understand 
how the loss of this freedom—freedom to do wrong—is to be lamented. If 
we could separate the freedom to do wrong from the freedom to do good, it 
seems we would be wise to do so. But can we separate the freedom to do 
wrong from the freedom to do good? The point of the free will defense is 
that we cannot. To have the one, we must have the other. 
Whether this is so, it seems to me, depends on the sort of evil we have in 
mind. For example, one evil deed I have been known to commit is telling 
my wife I will leave work at a particular time and then failing to do so. This 
makes me a liar. There is no nicer way to state the truth. I may have 
excuses—they may even be good ones—but in each case I have failed to 
live up to my word. Now I am certain that, if the government were to fine 
me or send me to jail every time I did this, in time I would get the message. 
I might even get the message very swiftly, but would it make me a better 
man? In one sense, yes, I would be a person who, in fact, keeps his word. In 
another sense, no, I would be a person who keeps his word, but only 
because I value my money or my freedom. In the most important sense—
the sense that really matters to my wife—I would still be selfish and a liar if 
given the chance. By forcing me to do right against my wishes, the 
government would have denied me the opportunity to choose to do right for 
                                                                                                                           
 103. The U.S. government “passes the hat” on April 15th of each year. State and local 
governments collect at other times of the year. 
 104. PLANTINGA, supra note 3, at 30. 
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the right reasons: because I love my wife, and because I wish to be the sort 
of person who keeps his word. 
I think there are many evils like this, evils whose elimination by force 
would deprive the world of much good. If I am right, then, it seems there 
are at least some evils—moral evils—that government should not attempt to 
suppress. To do so would be to deprive the world of much good—or at least 
the potential for much good. On the other hand, I think there are some evils 
that lack this property—at least in any useful sense. These are the sorts of 
evils—murders, robberies, and the like—that government exists to 
suppress. 
I mentioned before that government could address some evils by taking 
upon itself our moral responsibility to care for our neighbors. It could take 
up a collection, I said, and distribute the proceeds. This was euphemism, of 
course, because no one needs the government to take up a collection. Even 
beggars have the resources for this, and children have the knack for it. 
When the government passes the hat, no one has a choice about whether to 
contribute or even how much. It is “pay up or else.” If you or I took up a 
“collection” on these terms, we would be charged with robbery. 
Government enjoys an extraordinary power to take our money by force, 
and there are legitimate reasons for this power. For example, we all benefit 
from the protection government provides and the roads it builds. In some 
instances we can cover these costs with tolls and user fees, so that the 
people who benefit the most bear the greatest share of the cost. 
Nevertheless, there are many government services whose costs simply must 
be borne by the whole. I may never have to sue someone to vindicate my 
rights, but the fact that a judge is there, ready to protect me, serves as a 
strong deterrent to those who would defraud me. This is reason enough for 
me to have to contribute to the judge’s salary. If I have the ability to pay 
and I refuse to pay my fair share, after due notice and an opportunity to 
protest, I am a thief. The evil of theft falls within the class of evils that 
government may safely suppress. 
The taxes that concern us, however, are those the government collects 
for what would usually be considered charitable purposes. When 
government steps into the charitable arena, government is clearly taking on 
natural evils. I take it, for example, that when government sets out to 
provide health care to the poor, it is primarily addressing the natural evils of 
illness and physical infirmity. There is a sense, however, in which 
government is also addressing a moral evil. If each of us has a moral 
responsibility to look out for our neighbors, then government is also 
addressing the moral evil that represents our failure to discharge this 
responsibility. 
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Now it is certainly right for mankind to wrestle with natural evil. 
According to Hick, “this is what we are here for!”105 “[M]oral and spiritual 
growth[,]” he writes, “occur through overcoming evil . . . .”106 Indeed, 
according to Hick, God’s desire for such growth explains the kind of world 
we live in: 
It . . . does not seem to me that there is a viable possibility of a 
“soul-making” world from which we exclude all risk of severe 
hardship and injury, with desperate and even suicidal misery as 
the extreme point of the one continuum, and death as the extreme 
point of the other. The world, as a person-making environment, 
does not have to include the particular perils that it contains, but 
it does have to contain some particular perils and challenges 
which are real and which inevitably have, to us, an arbitrary and 
sometimes threatening character which is beyond our control.107  
Nevertheless, what may be appropriate—and even obligatory—for 
mankind can be dangerous and destructive for government. If we, too, 
desire to foster moral and spiritual growth, we must keep government out of 
the business of charity. 
As I have noted before, government only operates by force. This cannot 
be emphasized enough. As Bastiat observed, “law is force.”108 Government 
has nothing to give that it does not first take from someone else. Bastiat 
writes: 
[T]he law is not a breast that fills itself with milk. Nor are the 
lacteal veins of the law supplied with milk from a source outside 
the society. Nothing can enter the public treasury for the benefit 
of one citizen or one class unless other citizens and other classes 
have been forced to send it in.109 
This is true regardless of whether the government borrows from others or 
simply prints the money it gives away. It cannot put off paying forever,110 
and printing money is simply a tax in disguise. As Henry Hazlitt has 
written: 
                                                                                                                           
 105. HICK, supra note 4, at 376. 
 106. Id. (emphasis added). 
 107. Id. at 378-79; see also id. at 374. 
 108. BASTIAT, supra note 50, at 25 (emphasis added). 
 109. Id. at 24. 
 110. See HENRY HAZLITT, ECONOMICS IN ONE LESSON 175 (1979). 
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[T]he country as a whole cannot get anything without paying for 
it. Inflation itself is a form of taxation. It is perhaps the worst 
possible form, which usually bears hardest on those least able to 
pay. . . . It is a tax not only on every individual’s expenditures, 
but on his savings account and life insurance. It is, in fact, a flat 
capital levy, without exceptions, in which the poor man pays as 
high a percentage as the rich man.111 
We must not forget this point: when government sets out to do charitable 
work, it does so, not with its own money—it has none—but with the money 
of its citizens. As I noted before, no one needs government to take up a 
collection. We are all capable of that. What government brings to the table 
is force, and the evil it really seeks to address is not natural evil—it has no 
inherent capacity for this—but the moral evil that exists when men and 
women freely choose not to discharge their moral responsibility to care for 
others. As a moral evil, this seems to be exactly the sort of evil government 
exists to suppress. The question, however, is whether government can 
safely suppress it without suppressing moral good. 
I think our answer must be, “No.” The moral evil government would 
suppress here is a failure to do good—a failure to love, and a failure to 
give. Love cannot be compelled. Gifts cannot be compelled. This is 
analytic. 
Consider the case of relief for the poor. Assume that someone in my 
community needs food. If I observe this person in need and pass on—
assuming I have the means to give—you might say that I am “wicked.” But 
we must be very clear, however, about the nature of my wickedness. It is 
not the wickedness of actively causing an evil state of affairs, because I did 
not cause his hunger. My wickedness is an omission—a failure to be good. 
This explains why we praise those who do give their time or money to help 
others. They have done something good, not merely beneficial. By the same 
token, we do not praise those who refrain from embezzlement or arson. 
They have done something right, but that was only in accord with their 
                                                                                                                           
 111. Id. at 176. Andrew Bernstein makes a similar point: “Inflation is a form of stealth 
taxation. It is a covert governmental means of increasing its spending capacity without 
engaging in the politically unpopular act of overtly raising taxes. It is a surreptitious levy 
imposed on citizens in their role as consumer, not as taxpayer.” ANDREW BERNSTEIN, 
CAPITALISM UNBOUND: THE INCONTESTABLE MORAL CASE FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 117 
(2010). 
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duty. Ultimately, we all have a duty to love our neighbors as ourselves,112 
and God will judge us if we fail in this duty, but love is a positive virtue. 
Love may restrain us from acting in an unloving manner, but the failure to 
be unloving, is not the same thing as loving. 
Back to my neighbor—assume that government intervenes. Let us also 
assume, contrary to fact, that my government is remarkably efficient. It 
commands a social worker to take ten dollars from me and give it to my 
poor neighbor. There, the man is fed. The government has done its duty: it 
has compelled me to do mine. But have I really done my duty? I think not. I 
have not loved my neighbor because the choice about whether to give was 
not mine. The government chose for me. My only choice was whether to 
surrender my money or suffer the consequences. 
Who could avoid feeling some resentment toward the government and 
the person “I helped”? As Andrew Berstein has written: 
An individual will not feel love or affection toward one for whom 
he must sacrifice. He will experience only frustration, 
resentment, and bitterness. For example, if parents demand a 
child give up [a] career choice for one favored by the family, the 
child’s accession does not enhance but undermines his family 
intimacy. The sacrifice leads ineluctably to less affection for the 
parents—not more.113 
You may object that the social worker acted with good motives. The 
legislator, too, who commanded the transfer, probably acted with the best 
intentions. But is there any altruism here, any love? How do we know for 
sure? Giving away others’ money seems about as costly and noble as 
confessing others’ sins.114 
                                                                                                                           
 112. Leviticus 19:18 (NASB) (“You shall not take vengeance, nor bear any grudge 
against the sons of your people, but you shall love your neighbor as yourself; I am the 
LORD.”). 
 113. BERNSTIEN, supra note 110, at 89. 
 114. See C.S. LEWIS, Dangers of National Repentance, in GOD IN THE DOCK: ESSAYS ON 
THEOLOGY AND ETHICS 189-192 (Walter Hooper, ed., 1970). Lewis writes: 
A group of such young penitents will say, ‘Let us repent our national sins’; 
what they mean is, ‘Let us attribute to our neighbor (even our Christian 
neighbor) in the Cabinet, whenever we disagree with him, every abominable 
motive that Satan can suggest to our fancy.’  
Such an escape from personal repentance into that tempting region  
Where passions have the privilege to work  
And never hear the sound of their own names,  
would be welcome to the moral cowardice of anyone. 
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Theism’s critics understand very well the power of force—or even the 
prospect of reward—to undermine ethical behavior. Patrick Grim, for 
example, has argued the following: 
For many religions, action in this life is rewarded or punished in 
the next life. But action for reward or punishment is not 
genuinely ethical action. Far from grounding ethical action, this 
form of religious belief would seem to make it difficult for a 
believer to act ethically. Does this show that ethics and religion 
are incompatible? Not every religion has a heaven or hell. A 
religious believer might do the right thing simply because it is 
the right thing. But the tension remains: If one is a believer in 
heaven and hell, how can one be certain that reward is not one’s 
motivation?115 
Louise Antony developed a similar view of things when she was 
wrestling with whether to abandon the Catholicism of her youth.116 She 
writes: 
But now, grown up and in the throes of my religious crisis, I was 
struck by a perverse insight: that the perfect contrition that had 
eluded me hitherto might finally be achieved if I became an 
atheist. If I didn’t believe in God, then fear of eternal damnation 
could hardly be a reason for me to repent anything. If I, as a 
nonbeliever, felt contrite for having done something wrong, it 
could only be because it was wrong. If I ceased to fear God’s 
judgment, then the only possible reason I could ever have for 
doing good would be goodness itself. Much emboldened, I took 
my reasoning a step further: Maybe atheism was the only way to 
achieve perfect contrition, the only psychologically possible way 
for us fallible, selfish human beings to put aside concern for 
ourselves in confronting our misdeeds.117 
                                                                                                                           
Id. at 190 (quoting WORDSWORTH, THE PRELUDE, bk. XI, l. 230 (1850)). 
 115. PATRICK GRIM, Thoughts on Religion and Values, in THE GREAT COURSES: 
PHILOSOPHY & INTELLECTUAL HISTORY: QUESTIONS OF VALUE, pt. 1 (The Teaching 
Company, 2005). 
 116. See LOUISE ANTONY, Atheism as Perfect Piety, in IS GOODNESS WITHOUT GOD 
GOOD ENOUGH? 67, 67-69 (Robert K. Garcia & Nathan L. King, eds., 2009). 
 117. Id. at 69. Donald C. Hubin offers a related argument about the possibility for 
genuine theistic belief to render truly-sacrificial altruism impossible. See DONALD C. HUBIN, 
Empty and Ultimately Meaningless Gestures?, in IS GOODNESS WITHOUT GOD GOOD 
ENOUGH? 133-150 (Robert K. Garcia & Nathan L. King, eds., 2009). 
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It seems to me, however, that theists have a good response to this 
argument. As John Hick has written: 
In creating finite persons to love and be loved by Him God must 
endow them with a certain relative autonomy over against 
Himself. . . . God must set man at a distance from Himself, from 
which he can then voluntarily come to God. . . . The kind of 
distance between God and man that would make room for a 
degree of human autonomy is epistemic distance. In other words, 
the reality and presence of God must not be borne in upon men 
in the coercive way in which their natural environment forces 
itself upon their attention. The world must be to man, to some 
extent at least, etsi deus non daretur, “as if there were no 
God.”118 
If Hick is right, God’s apparent absence is what makes it possible for us to 
freely choose Him—or reject Him. Worship is thus not simply an act of 
obedience; it is also an act of faith. If we have a hard time achieving perfect 
contrition, perhaps our hearts are not right, but at least we have faith, 
without which “it is impossible to please Him.”119 After all, who can love 
what he does not know? Though God promises rewards for obeying Him, 
and punishment for disobeying Him, these, too, are set at a distance from 
us. If I may judge of my own experience, the trouble lies not in taking 
God’s promises too seriously, but in having any regard for them at all. All 
of which makes it possible for Christ to say, “If you love me, you will keep 
my commandments.”120 
This option—creating or maintaining epistemic distance—is hardly 
available to a government that wishes to suppress all evil. It must make its 
presence felt. The likelihood of punishment must approach near certainty—
or the punishment threatened must be very severe—if government is to 
have any hope at all of deterring all would be criminals. Again, criminals 
must know what they have coming to them, and they must have no hope of 
avoiding it. Of these two, certainty that punishment will be meted out may 
be the most important.121 
                                                                                                                           
 118. HICK, supra note 4, at 281. 
 119. Hebrews 11:6a (NASB). 
 120. John 14:15 (NASB) (emphasis added). 
 121. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 35 (4th ed. 2007) 
(citing RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, The Deterrent Effect of the Perceived Certainty and 
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412 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:379 
 
 
Thus “epistemic distance” is the last thing a government should strive for 
if it wishes to deter evil. Yet it is this very “epistemic proximity” that 
strains our ability to do good or to even know with any certainty that we are 
doing good. 
We should be clear, however. As Grim notes, the threat of punishment 
does not necessarily rule out the possibility of some right conduct. People 
“might [still] do the right thing simply because it is the right thing.”122 This 
is certainly true. I suspect—and hope—that most people refrain from 
murder because it is wrong, not simply because it is illegal. Nevertheless, I 
think Hick’s concept of epistemic distance is helpful here. When the threat 
of punishment seems remote, if only in time, it is quite easy to say, “I did it 
because it was right.” I may wonder in the back of my mind whether that 
was really so, but at least it seems plausible. I may even have a very good 
sense of my motivations, because I may have had to struggle with my 
decision to do the right thing. 
The notion that “I did it because it was right” seems a much harder sell—
to myself and others—when the consequences of doing wrong are swift and 
sure. I may still have a choice about what I do, but the greater the prospect 
of punishment, the smaller and less significant my choice becomes and the 
greater the chance that someone else’s choice will has replaced mine. 
This is the peril that government faces when it sets out to suppress all 
evil. The more its presence is felt, the less freedom citizens have to do or be 
good. Indeed, if the theologians are right, the price for no evil may be a 
world with no good. This strikes me as a terrible price to pay. If God was 
not willing to pay this price, why should we? 
IV. GOVERNMENT MUST, NEVERTHELESS, SEEK TO ELIMINATE SOME EVIL 
I now come to what is almost certainly my least controversial point, 
which is that government has a responsibility to suppress some evil. 
Perhaps only anarchists would quibble with this one. Nevertheless, I want 
to be clear, given my earlier remarks, that theists are not opposed to law and 
                                                                                                                           
Regarding the general deterrent value of punishment, research indicates that the 
benefit of punishment depends on various factors, including: the nature of the 
offense; the type of offender involved; the perceived risk of detection, arrest, 
and conviction; and the nature and severity of the penalties threatened or 
imposed. In general, however, an increase in the detection, arrest and 
conviction rate is of greater deterrent consequence than an increase in the 
severity of the penalty upon conviction. 
Id. 
 122. GRIM, supra note 114, at 23.  
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order. The Scriptures are clear that government exists to punish and deter 
evil.123 They are also clear that God is deeply troubled when government 
fails to discharge this duty.124 
This view is quite consistent with the free will defense. Plantinga says 
that significantly free creatures are worth the trouble as long as they “freely 
perform more good than evil actions . . . .”125 This condition—more good 
choices than bad choices—seems to have been violated in the era 
immediately before the Flood. According to Genesis, “the Lord saw that the 
wickedness of man was great on the earth, and that every intent of the 
thoughts of his heart was only evil continually.”126 
It should not come as surprise that one of God’s first statements to 
mankind after the Flood was about government: “[F]rom every man’s 
brother I will require the life of man. ‘Whoever sheds man’s blood, by man 
his blood shall be shed, for in the image of God He made man.’”127 God 
resolved not to destroy the earth again in this manner,128 but this was not 
because man’s propensity for evil had changed. The Lord observed after the 
Flood that “the intent of man’s heart is evil from his youth[.]”129 If mankind 
were going to continue on the earth, it would have to police itself—at least 
to a degree. The violence and corruption that characterized the era before 
the Flood130 would have to be suppressed. 
                                                                                                                           
 123. See, e.g., 1Peter 2:13-14 (NASB) (“Submit yourselves for the Lord’s sake to every 
human institution, whether to a king as the one in authority, or to governors as sent by him 
for the punishment of evildoers and the praise of those who do right.”). 
 124. See, e.g., Jeremiah 22:3-5 (NASB) 
Thus says the LORD, Do justice and righteousness, and deliver the one who has 
been robbed from the power of his oppressor. Also do not mistreat or do 
violence to the stranger, the orphan, or the widow; and do not shed innocent 
blood in this place. For if you men will indeed perform this thing, then kings 
will enter the gates of this house . . . . But if you will not obey these words, I 
swear by Myself, declares the LORD, “that this house will become a 
desolation.” 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 125. PLANTINGA, supra note 3, at 30. 
 126. Genesis 6:5-7 (NASB) (emphasis added). 
 127. Genesis 9:5b-6 (NASB). 
 128. See Genesis 8:21d (NASB) (“I will never again destroy every living thing, as I have 
done.”); Genesis 9:11 (NASB) (“I establish my covenant with you; and all flesh shall never 
again be cut off by the water of the flood, neither shall there again be a flood to destroy the 
earth.”). 
 129. Genesis 8:21c (NASB). 
 130. See Genesis 6:11-12 (NASB) (“Now the earth was corrupt in the sight of God, and 
the earth was filled with violence. God looked on the earth, and behold, it was corrupt; for 
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I need not belabor this point, however. Government must suppress some 
moral evils. As I have noted, only anarchists are likely to disagree. 
V. SYSTEMS OF LAW FOUNDED ON THEISM ARE BEST EQUIPPED TO 
RESOLVE THE PRACTICAL TENSION BETWEEN POINTS (1) AND (2), ON THE 
ONE HAND, AND POINT (3) ON THE OTHER. 
I have argued that government cannot eliminate all evil. It is simply 
impossible. I have also argued that government would be unwise to attempt 
to eliminate all evil—whether moral or natural. To do so would be to 
endanger, and possibly destroy, moral good. Yet government has a 
responsibility to suppress some moral evil. The question, it seems, is where 
to draw the line—and this is no easy question to answer. Reasonable minds 
will differ, but I want to contend—perhaps most controversially—that 
systems of law founded on theism are best equipped to draw the line in the 
right place. 
It seems to me that theists—in general—enjoy at least one advantage that 
atheists—in general—do not: theists tend to believe that our time on earth is 
more of a beginning than an end, and that God will have the last word in 
matters of good and evil. Thus the things we do and experience in this life 
are not to be evaluated in isolation, but rather as parts of a whole that 
extends beyond this life. 
Roderick Chisholm writes: 
 What if the evils of the world were defeated by some wider 
state of affairs that is absolutely good in the sense we have 
defined—what if the evils of the world were defeated by a 
certain state of affairs q such that q is good and such that any 
possible state of affairs entailing q is better than any possible 
state of affairs not entailing q? Epicurus said that if God is able 
but unwilling to prevent evil, then he is malevolent. But if the 
evil in the world is defeated and contained in a larger whole that 
is absolutely good, one should rather say that, if God had been 
able but unwilling to create such evil, then he would have been 
malevolent. . . .  
 . . . . 
                                                                                                                           
all flesh had corrupted their way upon the earth.”) “Corruption” appears to refer to moral 
turpitude in general, not just official corruption. 
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. . .  It is clear, I think, that this is the sort of thing that has been 
intended by the great theodicists in the history of western 
thought.131 
Chisholm’s use of the term “defeat” is significant. What he has in mind is 
the possibility for something evil to increase the value of the whole of 
which it is a part. He writes: 
 The unpleasant experience of fear, we may suppose, is a 
state of affairs that is intrinsically bad. But such experience is 
necessarily involved in the exercise of courage. And the exercise 
of courage, we may further suppose, is a virtuous activity that is 
intrinsically good. We need not pause to consider what else it is 
that goes with fear to make up courage. For the point of the 
present example is that the larger whole—the exercise of 
courage—is better intrinsically because of the badness of the 
part that is bad. . . .  
 . . . .  
. . . [W]hen evil is balanced off in a larger whole, we may, when 
considering the whole, regret or resent the presence of the evil 
there. But if these examples [inter alia, repentance and courage] 
are acceptable, then one should say, “Thank goodness for the 
badness of the part that is bad!”132 
We find a similar line of thought in Paul’s epistle to the Romans where Paul 
writes: 
The Spirit Himself testifies with our spirit that we are children of 
God, and if children, heirs also, heirs of God and fellow heirs 
with Christ, if indeed we suffer with Him so that we may also be 
glorified with Him. For I consider that the sufferings of this 
present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory that is 
to be revealed to us.133 
Consider also this passage from Paul’s second epistle to the Corinthians: 
[M]omentary, light affliction is producing for us an eternal 
weight of glory far beyond all comparison, while we look not at 
the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen; 
                                                                                                                           
 131. CHISHOLM, supra note 17, at 67-68 (“q” italicized for clarity). 
 132. Id. at 60. 
 133. Romans 8:16-18 (NASB) (emphasis added). 
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for the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which 
are not seen are eternal.134 
Because Christian theists see the relevant whole as larger than this life, 
we understand that we do not need to punish every wrongdoer or conquer 
every natural evil. We are right to contend with evil, but the world was not 
created for us to succeed in these endeavors. It was created for us to grow 
through these endeavors.135 We are able, thus, to find meaning in the evils 
we experience, and in our efforts to overcome them, even when those 
efforts are not wholly successful. We look forward to a time when God will 
make “all things new[,]”136 and a time when God will judge the wicked 
“according to their deeds.”137 Any justice we do on earth is merely 
provisional, for now. The God who is omniscient, omnipotent, and 
perfectly-good—as these characteristics are properly understood—will 
someday do justice and bring about good to a degree we can never hope to 
approximate. This is not, of course, an excuse for negligence on our part. 
We will be accountable to God for our acts and omissions138—which is 
good reason to tread carefully. 
I am not suggesting here that theists have always gotten things right. 
Colonial Americans were a theistic lot, and they sometimes strayed across 
the line between punishing evil and compelling virtue. As Lawrence 
Friedman writes: 
 The colonial laws punishing gaming, idleness, drunkenness, 
lying, and disobedient children are famous. A New Hampshire 
law of 1693—of a common type—punished those who “on the 
Lords day” were found to “doe any unnecessary Servall Labour, 
Travell, Sports,” or to frequent taverns, or “Idly Stragle 
abroad.”139 
Some of these crimes seem to punish a lack of good—a want of piety or 
temperance, for example—as much as they punish positive evil. If there is a 
middle ground between temperance and drunkenness, or piety and impiety, 
                                                                                                                           
 134. 2 Corinthians 4:17-18 (NASB) (emphasis added). Paul’s reference to “light 
afflictions” should not be understood as an attempt to diminish this world’s evil. Paul knew 
how dangerous and painful life could be. See, e.g., 2 Corinthians 11:23-27 (NASB). 
 135. See HICK, supra note 4, at 374. 
 136. Revelation 21:5b (NASB). 
 137. Revelation 20:12d (NASB). 
 138. See Matthew 25:41-46 (NASB). 
 139. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 72 (2d ed. 1985) (quoting 
LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, PROVINCE PERIOD, 1679-1702, 564 (1904)). 
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its boundaries are surely vague. When theists try and get it wrong—when 
they attempt to compel the good—eventually their theology should bring 
them around to the truth: that justice, in the end, is not up to them and that, 
if God prizes their freedom, perhaps they, too, should prize the freedom of 
others. 
It seems to me that this perspective is not available to non-theists—at 
least to those whose worldview does not allow for life beyond the grave. 
The whole they inhabit is necessarily much smaller. If the lives we have are 
the only lives we will ever have, then it seems that the job of addressing 
natural and moral evils is much more urgent. Evils that are not “defeated” 
in this life will never be defeated. Thus, we may not have the luxury of 
moral good. Perhaps we cannot afford freedom. Again, wrong that is not 
righted now will never be made right. 
The impulse to right every wrong while there is time is a noble one, but 
it is impossible for a government that lacks the proper resources. If 
government is aware of some problems but not others, how can I fault it for 
not responding to the burglary at my house? Perhaps it simply does not 
know what is happening. If it can respond to or prevent some problems but 
not others, how can I fault it for not sending the police when I call? Perhaps 
the officers were tied up on the other side of town. Again, if government 
agents are upright regarding some matters, and evil regarding others, how 
can I fault government if I run into a crooked cop now and again? It is not 
enough, therefore, for government to know about most evils, to be able to 
address or prevent most problems, or to be good with respect to most 
matters. If there is to be no evil, it must know about every evil and be able 
to address it, and its agents must be good enough, in every instance, to 
choose to do so. 
Thus it seems—from the non-theist’s perspective—that government 
must be made omniscient. It must be made omnipotent. It must be made 
perfectly-good. If there is no God, we must make one, but I cannot conceive 
of a way to accomplish this. And I think to attempt this is to court disaster.  
